

Nazi Germany and the Gleiwitz Incident (Part I)

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1. What is the Gleiwitz Incident? Walk us through the historical record.

Well, according to most historians, the Gleiwitz incident is the “false flag” that touched off World War II. Put simply, it was the Nazis’ *casus belli* “heard ‘round the world.” As well, this is what most common folks accept as true. The reality is far simpler and less exciting, however.

Nothing unusual happened at the Gleiwitz transmitter station on the night/early morning of 31 August. There was certainly no false flag event initiated by SS or SD troops there. However, a few vexing questions remain unanswered. I will ask and try to answer a few right now, and then I will ask and offer a few more alternative answers later on as we proceed through the sordid details.

Firstly, we do not know who the source for the official White Book report is for this purported event. There is an entry in the White Book for 31 August 1939 which is attributed to the Police President of Gleiwitz. There is a problem with this, however. The Police President at the time was a certain Mr. Schade, and he was murdered in a postwar Polish camp after his IMT (International Military Tribunal) interrogation in 1945.¹ He was never cross-examined during the trial.² As such, there’s no way to confirm that he is the actual source. It is possible that this man was in cahoots with the SS men who appeared at the transmitter station to conduct a brief (and seemingly innocent) radio exercise over the weather channel and who then promptly left. (*More about them later*). Did Mr. Schade take a vow of silence in this regard? If this is the case, then the report as well as the broadcast about a supposed “shootout and fatal wounding” at the station was an SS fabrication. It was bogus. Nothing happened and the fake report was planted to deceitfully implicate Poland in a scuffle and fatal shootout at the station, an event and death which never happened but which the Allies claimed did happen. Put simply, this was a fictitious report and broadcast that ultimately backfired on the SS and was in fact used against them with all kinds of lurid details added *post facto* by the Allies. This is a possible explanation. But there is *another* possible explanation. What if these SS men were not actually SS men, but imposters

¹ I am currently inquiring about the testimony of Herr Schade and I will update your readers, Jonas, as soon as I have that information. It is possible that Mr. Schade based his report on what he heard during the Breslau broadcast, assuming he did hear it that night and that it contained all the necessary details, but without seeing his testimony I cannot confirm or deny this. We do not know how he got the details for this report. We also do not know exactly what was said in that broadcast. “Earwitnesses” offer conflicting testimony in this regard.

² Cross-examination is when the defense attorney questions the prosecution’s witness(es), in this case Herr Schade, during a trial. Cross-examination allows the defense to present evidence via government witnesses.

with fake papers? Without Schade's *honest* account, we will likely never know if either of these explanations is correct.

Secondly, we do not know the source for the presumably live Breslau broadcast supporting the claim that the station was in Polish hands and that some sort of commotion was happening there at 20:00 hours. There was a Breslau broadcast in this regard because Captain Otto Radek³, who we will revisit later on, and a few other "earwitnesses" heard the broadcast. They got all excited about it since there were reportedly numerous such separate border shootouts/events that took place that night—none of which Hitler mentioned by name in his "infamous" war proclamation speech the following day. At any rate, unless the "few SS men" were responsible for this broadcast and the station personnel on duty that night were in cahoots with them to keep quiet about it, then they cannot be the source for this broadcast. All we know is that eyewitnesses at the station, including Radek's own subordinates with whom he spoke that night, testified that "a few SS men" showed up and conducted a radio exercise there at the station and then promptly left. There was no shooting, no disturbance, nothing. All was quiet, they asserted. If this is the case, then these SS men were innocent of creating a fictitious commotion and broadcast, and some *other* source is responsible. The questions to ask given this scenario are *who* was it and *how* was it done? We may never be able to answer these questions, but they must be asked since we do not have sufficient answers.

There is one other problem I must mention up front. Unlike the SS, the *Grenzpolizei* is mentioned by name in the White Book entry regarding the Gleiwitz transmitter station. It turns out that the *Grenzpolizei* worked intimately with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris' *Abwehr* (German Military Intelligence Service) on sabotage missions against Poland prior to the outbreak of war.⁴ The significance of this oft overlooked detail will become clear as we delve into the details of the incident at Mosty.

At any rate, you can see how and why the official record is so convoluted. The official narrative actually consists of many conflicting narratives featuring a whole range of oddball characters. We won't get into all the details here, but suffice it to say that the official story is nothing more than fanciful fiction. And poorly written fiction at that!

Let us briefly examine just a few details to unscramble this mess as best as possible. Historians overwhelmingly accept as true, as do most people who know of this "incident," that the SS, SD and Gestapo worked together to concoct an elaborate fake raid on the radio transmitter station located in Gleiwitz (now known as Gliwice⁵), a small border town located on the Polish-German frontier. By most accounts, a handful of either SS or SD men—historians are unable to agree on which it was—purportedly dressed up like "Polish soldiers" or "insurgents" and staged a shootout at the transmitter station. This shootout was purportedly led by the notorious Nazi turncoat Alfred Naujocks⁶, the sole source behind the Nuremberg account of the raid. These SS

³ See footnote 11.

⁴ See p. 437 in Vol. 1 of my Gleiwitz book: <https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1517072921/>

⁵ Pronounced "Glee-veets-uh"

⁶ During an attempted kidnapping gone sour, Alfred Naujocks accidentally shot and killed Rudolf Formis, the radio technician who was operating an illegal station near Prague in behalf of Hitler's personal enemy, Otto Strasser. Reinhard Heydrich, his superior at the time, was furious. At Venlo, just across the Dutch border, Mr. Naujocks

and/or SD men were supposed to have left a deceased man—only recently identified as a Polish citizen of German descent named Franz Honiok (minus any proof)⁷—at the scene as evidence that much more than just a scuffle took place there.⁸ However, some historians, [such as David Whitehead](#), seem to think that the SS/SD shot and killed a few of their *own* men to make the whole thing seem real, and that in fact hundreds of men took place in this whole covert operation (300 to be exact)—which includes two other “false flag” raids at Hohenlinden or Hochlinden (henceforth, H/H; historians cannot agree on which location it was) and Pitschen. In a nutshell, Mr. Whitehead merged several contradictory versions of the Gleiwitz incident in an attempt to sell the entire “Nazi false flag” story as legit. He failed in his mission because two (or more) fiction accounts are not better than one. My own research into this incident, and the other two purported false flags at H/H and Pitschen, proves that not a single one of these historians’ claims is verified. *Not a single one.*

As it stands, the Gleiwitz Nazi “false flag” incident is nothing more than a hoax. It is a media fabrication that may have originated with (and/or been expanded upon by) the traitorous Wilhelm Canaris and Co. residing safely behind the security of the much respected *Abwehr*⁹, abetted by fellow traitors such as General Halder, Erwin Lahousen, Herbert Mehlhorn, Hans Oster, and a handful of other traitors and sellouts during and after the war. I say this with relative confidence because the official account of what happened at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen is nearly identical to the real story of the incident at Mosty. I will briefly recount this incident now, minus the fine details which are all featured in my books.

Wilhelm Canaris’ *Abwehr* SO- and KO-Groups were entrusted to destroy or secure certain strategic points behind enemy lines prior to Germany’s official invasion of Poland. At the last minute, and much to Canaris’ chagrin if his surviving colleagues are to be believed, Hitler called off the invasion awaiting an answer from Italy concerning support for his Polish endeavor. Canaris’ *Abwehr* men had to scramble back out of Poland and retreat to Slovakia pending further notice from on high. One of Canaris’ men was caught (Josef Kulik), however, and an official inquiry was conducted by Polish military authorities as to why this German was cavorting around in their territory. He was able to assuage the Poles by feigning to have gotten lost and confused as to the border demarcation between Poland and Slovakia, and after a brief interrogation and investigation he was apparently released. This is so uncannily similar to how

nearly bungled the kidnapping of two British SIS agents suspected of assisting Georg Elser in the assassination attempt on Hitler at the *Bürgerbräukeller*—Mr. Stevens and Mr. Best. Since Mr. Naujocks did pull off the mission successfully, he was awarded the Iron Cross by Adolf Hitler.

⁷ See Bob Graham, “World War II’s first victim,” August 29, 2009, *The Telegraph on the Web*, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/6106566/World-War-IIs-first-victim.html> (accessed November 28, 2018).

⁸ Most mainstream historians assert that deceased concentration camp inmates (referred to as Heinrich Müller’s “canned goods”) were left at the scene as opposed to just a single man. However, few of these historians agree on the *number* of deceased men purportedly left at the scene; nor do any of these historians support their claims with reliable evidence. They all rely on conjecture and hearsay. See Heinz Höhne’s thesis, for example. (*Heinrich Müller was Chief of the Gestapo throughout the war. He disappeared or died in 1945.*)

⁹ There are two more possibilities as to the origins of the Gleiwitz report/incident, one of which is that it is an *Abwehr/Grenzpolizei* fabrication, the other of which it is a Polish-British fabrication. I explore both hypotheses in detail, accompanied by a wide range of evidence, in my two-volume book on the topic. Please see volumes 1 and 2 of *The Gleiwitz Incident: Nazi False Flag or Media Hoax?*, which is available directly from me or from Amazon.

the story of Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen is told by Mr. Whitehead and other historians that one is forced to take a second look and to compare them. Upon doing this, I have concluded that the Gleiwitz/H/H/Pitschen mega-incident is nothing more than a tall tale modeled on [the real incident at Mosty](#), perhaps to clear the name of Canaris and the reputation of the *Abwehr*, instead indicting and condemning specifically “Nazi” state organs (SS, SD and Gestapo). In other words, the Gleiwitz White Book report may be a case of cover (for the *Abwehr*) and projection (onto the Nazis). (*I explain in my two-volume book a range of possible Allied motives for doing this.*) If correct, this may explain why “*Abwehr*” and “*Grenzpolizei*”¹⁰ are both mentioned in that White Book entry and why zero references to the SS, SD or Gestapo are present in that same entry.¹¹ There is zero doubt that *Abwehr* traitors and fellow travelers expanded upon the fictitious incident with wild and sordid details implicating every Nazi organ they possibly could during and after the war, most notably during the IMT. This is beyond any doubt. But moving along here, also curiously missing from this entry is Captain Otto Radek and *3rd Company of Border Guard Battalion 1/68*.¹² He and his border guard, not the border/frontier police or anyone else, were in charge of station security that evening. Thus, when Mr. Radek heard some sort of commotion at the station via the nightly Breslau broadcast, he was taken aback and immediately made for the station via motorcar. To his complete surprise, all was quiet upon arrival and his fellow guardsmen reported that nothing had happened there. The traitorous *Abwehr* appears to be the missing link that makes sense amidst all the conflicting information surrounding this entry and the purported “Nazi false flag” at Gleiwitz,¹³ which I thoroughly

¹⁰ The *Abwehr* and *Grenzpolizei* worked intimately together throughout Canaris’ sabotage mission in Poland prior to the outbreak of war (i.e., leading up to the incident at Mosty). Unlike the SS, SD and Gestapo, IMT testimony exonerating these three agencies aside, neither the *Abwehr* nor the *Grenzpolizei* were implicated and/or condemned as criminal organizations during the IMT.

¹¹ If the SS was trying to be clandestine and circumspect about conducting fake border incidents, then why are they mentioned by name (*SS-Verfügungstruppe*) in the official White Book entry of 31 August 1939 as entry #5? Were the Nazis so stupid? Not to mention this border incident happened at Hoflinden, not Hohenlinden or Hochlinden.

¹² Otto Radek, First Lieutenant and later a Captain in World War I, was instructed to set up the border guard in the Gleiwitz area; he was also appointed commander in charge. Radek was a reserve officer and public school teacher, an upstanding citizen. Beginning on 24 August 1939 the border guard was deployed in full force; they received live ammunition with the objective to safeguard the region. The Gleiwitz transmitter station was secured by *3rd Company of Border Guard Battalion 1/68*.

¹³ Sometime in March 1937, senior *Abwehr* officer Paul Thümmel provided much significant information about the German intelligence services to Czech agents who in turn, forwarded the data to SIS London. Thümmel also delivered details over “military capabilities, and intentions” as well as “detailed information on the organization and structure of the *Abwehr* and SD” along with “the near-complete order of battle of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, and German mobilization plans.” He later provided advanced warnings of the German annexation of the Sudetenland as well as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland.” (See Jeffrey Richelson, *Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 85.)

Before spring 1938 came to an end, the conservative members of the German Foreign Office and many officers in the military expressed fears over the threat of a European war initiated by Hitler. A conspiratorial group formed around General Erwin von Witzleben and Admiral Canaris as a result. Throughout the process, Canaris and subordinates such as Helmuth Groscurth worked to prevent war. Canaris participated in the plots among the military leadership for a coup against Hitler and attempted to establish covert communication lines with the British. Before the invasion of Poland occurred, the *Abwehr* went so far as to send a special emissary, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, to London in order to warn them. (See Klaus Hildebrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), 70–71; Richard Bassett, *Hitler’s Spy Chief: The Wilhelm Canaris Betrayal* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2011), 147–164; and Gerhard Weinberg, *Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II* (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 585.

explain and explore in my two books.¹⁴ One has to read both books to piece the entire case against the *Abwehr* and other traitors together, as there are many layers to this rotten onion.

At any rate, “*Abwehr*” is an odd term to use in this entry seeing as how *Die Abwehr* was the name of Germany’s Military Intelligence Service at the time. We are expected to accept without question that *no other term* was appropriate in this entry and context. It just strikes me as odd. And again, this particular entry is attributed to none other than Police President W. Schade, a man murdered not by Nazis but, as I will address again later, by Poles in a postwar concentration camp in 1945.¹⁵ After the war, when Mr. Radek attempted to properly investigate what did take place at the station that night, if anything, his efforts were thwarted in interesting ways. I detail all of this in my books. In any event, it seems obvious who was silencing who here.

Permit me to further speculate about the transmitter entry as a possible *Abwehr/Grenzpolizei* fake. The source for the White Book entry must also have been the source (or was in close touch with the source) for the Gleiwitz incident news stories/reports put out by the DNB (*Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro*¹⁶) and the *Völkischer Beobachter* (VB). Whoever that source was, it seems to me, was trying to make the Nazi press look bad. And it is a fact that several *Abwehr* traitors along with their allies were working to subvert Hitler since 1937, especially regarding his diplomacy concerning Poland. Maybe said source planted this White Book entry knowing that not only the Nazi press but the Allied press too would pick up on it and use it against Germany (i.e., that Hitler had “started the war with a lie”). In other words, maybe the Allied press was tipped off about this purported “incident” (along with the two others at H/H and Pitschen, which the British press also reported on) and subsequent White Book report, and so they could utilize it how they wanted against Germany. Indeed, the British press had reported on these incidents (Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen) before they were even completed! As well, both the DNB and VB agencies reported an incident at Gleiwitz featuring contradictory details to those of the White Book and to those of the Allied versions (including that of Mr. Naujocks). I explore all of these problems in my books.

¹⁴ The only rival explanation (i.e., the official Revisionist explanation) which is not without its own problems is that Polish insurgents operating out of a local bank front (i.e., the “posh Polish bank branch” as described by Revisionist Carlos Porter) really did attack the station, and this whole thing was covered up by the Allies *post facto*. The incident was then turned around on the Nazis, hence the need for Alfred Naujocks’ affidavits for the IMT. But this explanation ignores the Mosty parallels completely, and it does not account for *who* was behind the Breslau broadcast about a shootout and scuffle at the radio transmitter station that certain “earwitnesses” claim to have heard. Of course, not only the shootout and scuffle but the Breslau broadcast in Polish and German could have been conducted by Polish insurgents, but there are conflicting eyewitness/earwitness reports asserting that NOTHING at all happened at the station. No insurgents, no nothing. I explore *all* possibilities in my books, without committing myself 100% to any *single* explanation owing to a few unanswerable questions. My hope is that my books will prompt further inquiry and perhaps we will get some definitive answers at last. What I can say with 100% certainty is that the Nazis did not conduct a false flag there or anywhere else on the border that evening/early morning.

¹⁵ Might Mr. Schade have been working with *Abwehr/Grenzpolizei* subversives/traitors in this regard? Yet another possibility. It would certainly explain why he could not be cross-examined (*Abwehr* and fellow traitors had to be protected throughout the IMT for the prosecution’s sake) and why he had to be murdered by the Allies as quickly as possible, so as not to be further questioned or allowed to talk to the public or write contradictory memoirs *post facto*. Bear in mind too that the Gleiwitz station manager, Herr Klose, was murdered by partisans in 1945. Odd, no?

¹⁶ The *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro GmbH* (DNB) was the official, central press agency of the German Reich at the time of National Socialism.

Let's move on.

Deeper research into the purported Gleiwitz incident indicates that nothing happened at the transmitter station aside from a brief SS radio exercise/test. There was no commotion, no shootout and no fake Polish soldiers or ruffians. The Gleiwitz hoax was laid to rest for the remainder of the war. Even most mainstream historians refer to it as “forgotten,” “little known” or “insignificant.” However, it was resurrected for the IMT to indict the Nazis in particular as the sole guilty party for the outbreak of war with Poland, and all by most murderous and deceitful means! Germany had to look bad. Because, as we all know, the USSR really was bad. The worst kind of bad. And Britain was bad too. The British leadership, notably Sir Winston Churchill, was very interested in war breaking out on the Continent to the benefit of the Empire's longstanding “Divide and Conquer” strategy. Somehow the Nazis had to look worse than everyone else.

The spotlight of condemnation had to remain on Germany. Touching off the world's worst war by needless murder and clandestine trickery was the perfect indictment of an otherwise honorable nation. Throughout the IMT, it only got worse for Germany. Indeed, this Gleiwitz incident set the stage for the entire Allied *casus belli* against Germany. Germany, and Germany alone, was the sole culprit for the outbreak of war. By any means necessary. I would also venture to guess that the incident at Venlo, during which the Germans seized two English SIS spies just across the Dutch border, had something to do with the resurrection of the Gleiwitz hoax for the IMT. Though, your readers and fans may consult my two-volume set entitled [*The Gleiwitz Incident: Nazi False Flag or Media Hoax?*](#) for those (and many more) details, Jonas.

In any event, the Gleiwitz fiasco is best known to historians and the public as either *Operation Himmler* or *Operation Tannenberg*. Yes, you read that right folks! Historians cannot even agree on the name of this “false flag” without which Hitler had no just cause for war against Poland. Had so many lives not been lost in that conflagration, and had not so much needless guilt and personal smearing been meted out against otherwise innocent parties and persons, this whole thing would be comical.

Permit me to digress for just a moment and recap because the following two points need to sink in. First, qualified historians cannot even agree on *what* this “false flag” operation was *called*. Yet, *without* this operation (and the two others that supposedly went along with it at H/H and Pitschen), (we are told that) Hitler couldn't even hope to sell his invasion of Poland to the German people as legit, let alone to the world. It was, per the official historical record, his “*casus belli*”. Secondly, historians cannot decide if it was the Gestapo, SS or SD, or all three(!), that led the three purported border raids, nor how many men were involved in each. The official narratives are a shambles. Really, these two points alone establish the untenability of the official historical record regarding Gleiwitz. And if the record is this problematic, why should Germans (then as now) bear any guilt in this regard? This is in fact why the truth about what did and did not happen at the Gleiwitz transmitter station is so important to reveal. Germans have been bearing needless guilt and shame regarding this aspect of World War II. I believe historian Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof has called it “[*the war that had MANY fathers*](#),” not just one father. Moreover, as with Lord Dacre's *Table Talk*, which Dr. Richard Carrier has again blasted as an

essentially worthless record of Hitler's utterings¹⁷, real Third Reich history (Real3R) has been evading the public for decades. It is high past time to set the entire World War II record straight.

In a nutshell, my tentative conclusion about Gleiwitz is as follows:

The German White Book 'Gleiwitz incident' entry of 31 August 1939 originates with 1) *Abwehr/Grenzpolizei* traitors, or 2) Police President W. Schade. Since Herr Schade was conveniently murdered in a postwar Polish concentration camp in 1945, as aforesaid, he is not the likeliest suspect. Unfortunately, Canaris was killed by the Nazi state for his long-lived treachery, so there will likely never be a sure way to confirm who, precisely, originated this official report. Suffice it to say that in the light of all the evidence, or lack thereof, as well as the Mosty incident, which implicates the *Abwehr*, *Grenzpolizei* and Canaris in provable 'war crimes' as well as in regards to violation of Poland's sovereignty when war was not yet on, the *Abwehr*, *Grenzpolizei* and Canaris are the likeliest suspects. I hardly need mention that Hitler called the war off on 25 August¹⁸, so if he was going to utilize alleged "false flag" raids at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen as his reason(s) for war, why would all three "false flags" *only* be planned for (and actually take place on) 31 August and not also on the evening/early morning of 24/25 August as with Mosty? Talk about playing with fire! Please recall that the invasion took place on 1 September, not on 26 August as originally planned. It was not until *recently* that the official narrative tried to mitigate this blatant error. *Every single account* has asserted that all three "raids" took place on the evening/early morning of 31 August. Moreover, why did Hitler neglect to mention a *single* one of these most coveted of false flag events by name in his declaration of war speech the next day? That's a huge problem that not a single historian has addressed. Until now, of course.

Permit me to ask a couple more vexing questions, which I explore in my two-book set.

The Allied press, specifically in Britain and the US, as well as the *Völkischer Beobachter* (official NSDAP newspaper) and the DNB (semi-official news agency with Allied connections and employees) put out conflicting and disputable versions of the alleged incident.

Why?

Who delivered the Breslau broadcast about what reportedly happened at the Gleiwitz transmitter station? Was it a traitor? An Allied mole?

Let's ponder these possibilities for a moment.

¹⁷ He wrote on his blog, "historians are so annoyed that they don't have good sources, that they start unconsciously acting like the sources they do have are good. Because, you know, "it's all we have," and "we have to work with what we have." Historians all too often leverage sources with hope rather than fact: a source sucks and is unreliable, but is all they have, so they treat it as authoritative and reliable. This has happened with *Hitler's Table Talk*: the vast suspicion that surrounds its reliability is ignored, and it continues to be treated as the verbatim words of Hitler, when in fact it appears actually to be the words of minions recording their recollections of him, and later editors who changed up what they wanted." See Richard Carrier, "History as a Science," October 7, 2016, <https://www.richardcarrier.info/archives/11311> (accessed November 27, 2018).

¹⁸ Hitler had set the invasion of Poland date as August 26, but on August 25 he called off the attack when he heard that Britain signed a new treaty with Poland, promising military support.

A traitor or mole would be motivated to sabotage Hitler's war effort and/or to undermine his credibility and/or honorable conduct. This was in fact one of the earliest goals of the traitors in the *Abwehr* (their collective sabotage of Hitler's diplomatic efforts commenced in 1937).

The Allied press reported soon after Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939 that he had "started the war with a lie." Who fed the Allied press this line? That "lie" consisted of the "false flags" perpetrated by the instruments of the NSDAP itself (Gestapo, SS and SD) at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen. However, not one of these "false flags" has any evidence to support it.

Revisionist historian Carlos W. Porter mentions a "posh Polish bank branch" near the border which did "very little business." It was allowed to exist and operate with the German authorities' permission. Oddly, it disappeared right around the time of the purported Gleiwitz "false flag." Did any of these folks have British and/or *Abwehr/Grenzpolizei* traitor connections or contacts? If so, might their involvement in this "false flag" hoax (at the time) explain the murder of Gleiwitz transmitter station manager Klose (murdered by partisans in 1945) as well as the murder of Gleiwitz police president Schade? If this Polish bank branch was involved at any level in this "false flag" hoax, then my hypothesis accounts for both its existence and sudden disappearance, something that has thus far eluded historians. Perhaps the *Abwehr* and/or *Grenzpolizei* had something to do with it.

Permit me to ask another important question.

Why was this "false flag" hoax resurrected after the war, and why did it receive so much attention during the IMT and after the war as it pertains to the Allied narrative? (*See accompanying appendix of actual IMT testimony.*) Remember, it was "insignificant" and "little known" at the time (even though it was supposed to be Hitler's *casus belli* Number One). One sensible explanation is that the *Abwehr*'s traitorous agents—e.g., Erwin Lahousen and Wilhelm Canaris in absentia—as well as SD/SS turncoats, such as Alfred Naujocks (who defected to the Allies toward the end of the war) and even Heinrich Himmler's adjutant Karl Wolff, were needed as star witnesses for the prosecution (and later on for the Cold War as American allies). As such, these people's 'war crimes' and the *Abwehr*'s 'war crimes' at Mosty et. al were simply dismissed or apparently attributed to dead men and/or the SS, SD and Gestapo via Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen.

The *Abwehr*'s and these other traitors' suspected role in concocting these "false flag" reports and stories—either at the time (in 1939) or later on during the IMT, or in postwar memoirs and magazine interviews like the one featuring Herbert Mehlhorn in *Stern* in 1952—seems undeniable. The purported "false flags" at Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen mirrored their own sabotage missions in Poland nearly to a tee. That's uncanny. Not to mention Alfred Naujocks' two missions against Formis and the SIS agents resemble the Gleiwitz scene enough to render Gleiwitz a fictional copycat.

Lastly, we must ask why Alfred Naujocks' IMT affidavits mention only *two* "false flag" sites (Gleiwitz and Hohenlinden) while the IMT and postwar accounts of other suspected actors in this hoax (e.g., Lahousen and Mehlhorn) mention *three* sites, one of which is incorrect (Hochlinden)?

Is this because the IMT “evidence” and postwar “history” had to match Hitler’s actual 1 September proclamation, wherein he casually mentioned *three* sites and not just two? It sure makes one wonder, especially since Hitler failed to name them specifically. Indeed, he failed to exploit any of them as his *casus belli*. Instead, he and Dr. Goebbels’ propaganda machine exploited the [Bromberg Massacre](#) (which took place two days after the invasion on 3 September) and other alleged Polish atrocities and persecutions against German minorities residing in Poland. Just check out the book [*Die polnischen Greueltaten an den Volksdeutschen in Polen: Im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes auf Grund urkundlichen Beweismaterials zusammengestellt, bearbeitet und herausgegeben.*](#) What’s more, the British already knew Hitler’s real *casus belli*, which is featured in the [secret Whitehall Report](#).

I must admit, the Allies were clever. But they were also sloppy. They were equally sloppy regarding the Crystal Night “telexes” that they concocted out of thin air for the IMT prosecution.

Let’s recap the main points of our interview thus far.

The Gleiwitz false flag never took place.

What reportedly did take place was a brief radio exercise or test conducted by a few purported SS men who properly identified themselves to station personnel on duty that night. Since the Gleiwitz station’s weather channel was not intended to broadcast far and wide but only locally (another glaring problem with the official narrative which I delve into in my books), it was the perfect station to conduct a relatively private test or exercise. (*It was also the perfect station to serve as setting for a media hoax.*) What these SS men’s motives were for conducting said exercise/test remains unclear. My own research has revealed that communications were cut or failing all along the frontier leading up to the war, so it may be that they were simply interested to see whether the station was still functioning as intended. Perhaps they might need to use it for local communications purposes. It’s hard to say, but nothing sinister happened at that station and there are several witnesses who have attested to that. Those who have contradicted this version of what happened there, or could have contradicted it, are all confirmed traitors and/or IMT prosecution star witnesses. Or, they were murdered or died untimely deaths.

Convenient, isn’t it?

The Gleiwitz false flag is based on a real *Abwehr/Grenzpolizei* sabotage (“war crime”) mission behind Polish lines (i.e., the incident at Mosty).

At this point in our discussion, Jonas, it should not surprise anyone to learn that all of the surviving “stars” of the Gleiwitz, H/H and Pitschen stories were *Abwehr* traitors or SD/SS turncoats. What’s more, many of these same “stars” featured prominently for the IMT prosecution.

What a coincidence, eh?

The Gleiwitz hoax may have originated with *Abwehr/Grenzpolizei* traitors and was resurrected during the IMT as revenge for the Venlo affair.

After all, it was none other than Mr. Naujocks who successfully pulled off the kidnapping of two British SIS agents, Stevens and Best, by brazenly dashing across the Dutch border and hauling them off by motorcar after a brief scuffle and shootout. Mr. Churchill was furious and had to revamp the entire SIS as a direct result. This affair embarrassed Britain immensely—to be involved in such shenanigans! What’s more, the Dutch had violated their own neutrality by allowing said agents to use their country as a spies’ playground. Hitler exploited this incident for all it was worth, which was quite a lot. It was such a lethal blow to British prestige and fair play that Mr. Winston Churchill and his fellow British authorities would have had good reason to use the very man who captured their agents, a man who had caused them so much political pain and international embarrassment, for their IMT *casus belli* against Germany. That man was none other than Mr. Naujocks.

Hence the resurrection of the Gleiwitz hoax for the IMT featuring Alfred Naujocks as star witness! The IMT scene likely went something like this: “We wrote up these nice affidavits for you, Mr. Naujocks. You sign your name to them and we let you go. Sound good?”

After signing off on the Gleiwitz affidavit (along with two others), Mr. Naujocks disappeared—until his strange death in the 1960s. You see, Mr. Naujocks was just about to be brought to trial by the West German government for the death of a man at the Gleiwitz transmitter station—because that’s what the [official 1961 Gleiwitz movie put out by the communist East German government](#) claimed had happened!!—when he just up and died. Or he disappeared. Historians are not *exactly* sure which it was. But the craziest thing about that trial is that Naujocks was cleared of all charges (in absentia). The man who was allegedly shot and left for dead at the Gleiwitz station could not be identified. In fact, the prosecution could not establish that a shooting or murder had even taken place there! Yeah, the rabbit hole does go deep on this one.

I could go on and on with the curious details of this incident, but that would defeat the purpose of my two-volume book on this topic. I recommend folks read both books in order to know the Gleiwitz incident, and so much more, inside and out.

2. Did Hitler use it to invade Poland? What about other historians who do say that it was a legitimate move?

As a matter of fact, Hitler did not utilize the Gleiwitz incident at all. Uncanny, really...seeing as how it was supposed to have made his case for war with Poland and all. Among the most pressing problems about what purportedly transpired at Gleiwitz, at least as I see it, is that there are countless versions of this most ‘singular’ event. How is this possible since there is only ever one version of the truth?

To my knowledge, there is not a single historian who claims that the purported “false flag” at Gleiwitz was legitimate. Some historians have supported Hitler’s real motives for invading Poland, which are fully fleshed out in my two-volume book set, though said historians are few and far between. Most historians condemn every move Hitler and Germany made because that is what political correctness guides them to do. They are shackled by the official World War II narrative, which must always be anti-Nazi.

Having said that, TIME magazine ran the following story on Monday, 29 May 1939:

*“King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou were murdered at Marseille in 1934 by a professional assassin whose Italian connections were carefully hushed. Two years ago British Ambassador to China Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen was machine-gunned and dangerously wounded by a Japanese plane. During the Spanish Civil War “pirate” submarines torpedoed British and French merchantmen. If an incident were needed to start a war, **the world has recently had plenty of them.**”* (emphasis added)

Yes, the world, including Hitler himself, had witnessed many incidents that could rightly have been used as pretexts for war. If this was the case, then why were and are Hitler’s reasons considered “unjust”? The fact of the matter is that Hitler did not need a raid at the Gleiwitz station to invade Poland. In fact, an incident concerning a certain Mr. Gruebner is recognized by the media here as a valid case for war. The TIME journalist was in fact wondering whether Hitler would use this man’s murder as his *casus belli* against Poland.

The TIME article went on to report that

“Early this week there was another, this one at Kaltof in highly inflammable Danzig. Involved was no highly placed ruler or diplomat, but a German butcher named Gustav Gruebner, who was killed by a shot fired from an official Polish automobile. Since incidents amount to what nations want to make them, Führer Adolf Hitler could give Butcher Gruebner a sure niche in history by deciding that this was just the right kind of provocation he needed to march into Danzig.”

Hmm...I thought that the Gleiwitz raid was “just the sort of incident” Hitler needed? What happened to that?

We then read:

“There are always two versions to diplomatic incidents, and l’affaire Gruebner was no exception. The Polish account: the Polish Vice-Commissioner to Danzig went to Kaltof to investigate the sacking of a Polish customs house by a German mob; his party was attacked, compelling his chauffeur to fire in self-defense. To this the German version bears little resemblance: there was merely an orderly demonstration against ‘molestations’ of German girls by Polish officials, and Gustav Gruebner was plugged for no reason at all. The Nazi-controlled Danzig Government through the Senate President promptly demanded compensation for Butcher Gustav’s bereaved relatives, apologies, and the surrender of the ‘murderer.’ The Poles made counter-demands: punishment of those guilty of the attack on the customs house, compensation for damages and assurances for the protection of Polish interests.”

As we can see, both sides were antagonizing one another, and both sides had legitimate grievances. Germany was no more or less guilty for touching off World War II than Poland (or Britain, or France, or the US, or the USSR). As the old saying goes, “it takes two to Tango.”¹⁹

3. Who preempted who: Stalin or Hitler?

They preempted one another, of course. Both Hitler and Stalin had imperial intent and imperial designs vis-à-vis eastern Europe. The only question, really, is which man was willing to go further than the other as far as his political and geographical ambitions were concerned. The two men knew all too well the basic intentions of the other owing to their pact (the Russo-German Agreement, a.k.a. Nazi-Soviet Pact) with its secret clause to partition eastern Europe between the two European monoliths. As well, Poland knew Hitler’s intentions owing to his and Hermann Göring’s incredible efforts to woo the sandwiched nation into some sort of pact against the Russian colossus. It’s possible that Polish officials shared some of that knowledge with their Russian contacts, though that would need to be confirmed by Polish and Russian sources. For the time being, call it a reasonable hunch on my part, especially in the light of historian [Rolf Dieter-Müller’s research into the German-Russian war](#).

As I wrote in Chapter 4 of *The Hitler Worship Cult*:

*“The Nazis believed, correctly as it turns out, that Stalin harbored aggressive intent against Poland and other parts of eastern Europe. And this is why Hitler was so angry at the Poles for refusing to join him in an anti-Soviet alliance. This is in fact the basis of Hitler’s anti-Polonism, which had nothing to do with “racial inferiority.” But the Poles did not trust Hitler not to make untenable demands, especially concerning Polish self-rule, if they did link up with Germany in such an alliance. The Poles did not trust that Hitler was not up to some ruse; therefore, they rejected Hitler’s peace overtures.”*²⁰

According to the compelling thesis of Russian historian [Constantine Pleshakov](#), which is supported by fellow Russian historian [Viktor Suvorov](#), Stalin had a preemptive plan of his own. He proceeded to go ahead with it only after receiving assurances from the Japanese minister Matsuoka, in April 1941, that Japan not only knew of Hitler’s intent to eventually strike out at the USSR but that Japan wished to sign a neutrality pact with Stalin.

On 5 May 1941, Stalin pronounced himself ‘prime minister’ (i.e., Council of People’s Commissars). That same day he gave his infamous Red Army academy speech, the one in which

¹⁹ For much more detail about this TIME article and Hitler’s real reasons for war against Poland, please consult my book co-written with J. A. Sexton entitled [The Hitler Worship Cult: Distortion, Justification & Mythmaking](#). We have included countless important details, such as the following: “...the German death figure of about 5,000 blew up into 58,000, and then 300,000 by the time Hitler heard about it...actual conference minutes of Hitler and his generals confirm the thesis that Hitler was willing to use force against Poland as early as March 1939 (five months’ prior to the alleged ‘anti-German massacres and atrocities’ and the physical invasion in August).”

This Hitler Worship Cult myth just collapsed. Totally. Poland was not in a position to launch an offensive war against Germany, which is why Hitler used the alleged mass persecution of ethnic Germans in Poland as his public *casus belli*. He could not sell his war to the German (or world) public otherwise.” (p. 29) Hitler never cited the purported Gleiwitz incident, not privately or publicly.

²⁰ See p. 33.

he announced, “it is time to go from a posture of defense to one of attack.” Marshal Shaposhnikov originated Stalin’s preemptive war blueprint while the much younger Alexander Vasilevsky was its architect.

The final offensive plan, per Pleshakov, went as follows:

The Kiev Military District was to lead the attack at the Southwestern Front. These troops would strike at Krakow. This front was to consist of one million men and 8,000 tanks. Romania was also set to be invaded by this group. The northern Western Military District, now the Western Front, was to strike Warsaw. Stalin’s goal was to reach a line running from Ostroleka in Poland to Lowicz, Lodz, Kluczbork, Opole, and finally the Czech city of Olomouc in thirty days. Olomouc was only 270 miles from Munich and 100 miles from Vienna. The Western Front troops, being weaker, were expected to stop at Ostroleka; they were then expected to turn north and occupy eastern Prussia and the rest of Poland.

The plan does not specify what was to happen next, though Pleshakov suspects that Stalin would have demanded a peace deal granting him all of eastern Europe. While Mr. Pleshakov does not believe that Stalin would have gone so far as to strike Germany herself, who knows what he might have done?

In any case, this plan demanded a preemptive strike for which Ukraine was to serve as the “springboard of aggression.” To disguise the massive reserve armies that were needed on these fronts, the Soviet generals suggested the smokescreen of “training exercises.” This explains in part why Hitler had to invade and occupy Ukraine and other eastern European countries that he had formerly handed over to Stalin for the sake of his own imperial agenda in said region.

The following IMT testimony of anti-Hitler traitor Gerd von Rundstedt²¹ is most informative in this regard:

DR. LATERNSE: You participated in the conference in March 1941, when Hitler spoke of the necessity of attacking the Soviet Union?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.

DR. LATERNSE: What were you told about Soviet preparations?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Until a short time before that I had been in France, and I had no knowledge whatever of the ostensible preparations of the Russians. At the conference, to our surprise, we were told that the Russians were very strongly armed, were concentrating troops and preparing to attack us. If I am not mistaken, information from the Japanese Military Attaché was referred to, and a map of the Russian distribution of forces on the borders of Poland was shown to us, so that we had to assume that these facts were actually true.

²¹ It is important to denote that Rundstedt was a traitor against Hitler, as he would have had good reason to implicate Hitler for an unprovoked war of aggression against the USSR for the IMT. As it turns out, he believed that Hitler was correct about Soviet intent.

DR. LATERNER: Was this impression confirmed after the entry into Russia?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. The resistance at the border was not too great, but it grew continually as we advanced into the interior of the country. Very strong tank forces, tanks of a better type, far superior to ours, appeared; and an enormous number of airfields, troop camps, munitions dumps, and newly built roads through impassable territory were encountered. Maps were also found, showing German territory as far as Silesia, **so that we had the impression that Hitler must have been right.**²² (emphasis added)

It does indeed take *two* to Tango.

²² The Avalon Project, "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings: Volume 21 - Two Hundred and First Day Monday; 12 August 1946," *yale.edu*, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-12-46.asp> (accessed November 30, 2018).

Appendix

(relevant IMT testimony)

27 Aug. 46

I shall now turn to Section B: Crimes against Peace (Statement of Evidence V of the English trial brief against the Gestapo and SD).

As a crime against peace the SD is accused of having staged so-called border incidents before the outbreak of the war to give Hitler an excuse for starting the war. The Prosecution, however, referred to only one border incident in which the SD is alleged to have participated. That is the alleged attack on the Gleiwitz radio station.

In this connection the Prosecution made reference to the affidavit of Alfred Naujocks of 20 November 1945. This is Prosecution Document 2751-PS. The deponent of Document 2751-PS, Alfred Naujocks, was heard before the Commission. On that occasion he declared that the execution of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station was not included in the aims and purposes of Aemter III and VI.

The witness further testified that no sections of Aemter III and VI were used for the execution of that border incident in Gleiwitz and that the men who with him attacked the Gleiwitz station did not belong to the SD, Amt III.

The witness also stated that by the term "SD men" in his affidavit of 20 November 1945 he did not mean the members of any definite office of the RSHA; but common usage of the term "SD men" referred to RSHA members of all offices which were subordinate to Heydrich.

The witness further stated that he was charged with the execution of the border incident at Gleiwitz, not because he belonged to Amt VI and worked there, but that exclusively personal reasons were responsible for that decision. The witness testified that on the basis of the conversation he had had with Heydrich he had gained the impression that Heydrich would have given him that assignment even if he had not been a member of Amt VI and the SS. The order for the execution of this assignment reached the witness Naujocks not through the official channels of the chiefs of Aemter III or VI. The chiefs of Aemter III and VI had no knowledge of this action.

The members of the SD, Amt III and Amt VI, had no knowledge that the attack was carried out by Naujocks, a member of Amt VI. Particularly the members of the SD-Leitabschnitt which was in charge of Gleiwitz, and the outpost of the SD, had no knowledge of this activity and could not have had, because Naujocks had been forbidden to get in touch with any members of the SD whatsoever in that territory.

The statements of this witness have been reaffirmed by the witness Somman and through Affidavit Number SD-11, deposed by Dr. Marx.

I also submitted 215 affidavits for the office of the RSHA as well as for all territories of the SD-Leitabschnitte and the SD-Abschnitte, particularly for those situated in the regions of Katowice, Danzig, and Saxony. Those affidavits testify that the members of the SD during the critical time had no knowledge of the faked border incidents or the participation of the SD in them.

The affidavit by the witness Dr. Mildner (2479-PS) is refuted by the testimony of the witness Naujocks and Affidavit Number SD-11, Dr. Marx. This subject matter does not provide sufficient grounds to declare the SD to have been criminal, since this would presuppose proof of the fact that the SD as an organization was employed in the aggression, and that its members had cognizance thereof. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-27-46.asp>)

29 Aug. 46

The largest branch of the SS, the Waffen-SS, was created and developed for the sole purpose of carrying on the war and participated, as an SS army, in all phases of the war in the East and in the West. Its shameful record of war atrocities needs no amplification here. The Gestapo and SD were likewise involved in the commission of crimes against the peace. The very incident that served as an excuse for the invasion of Poland, and thus set off the entire war, was executed by the Gestapo and the SD. I refer to the simulated Polish attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz, where concentration camp prisoners were dressed in Polish uniforms, murdered, and left as evidence of a Polish raid, so as to afford Hitler a justification for the attack upon Poland. Of course the professional military clique planned and participated in all aggressions from the militarization of the Rhineland in 1936 to the attack on Soviet Russia in 1941. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-29-46.asp>)

23 Aug. 46

In line with the method followed in the Indictment, I shall subdivide the crimes of which the Gestapo is accused into Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity.

(a) Crimes against Peace.

In this connection the Indictment makes the charge that the Gestapo, together with the SD, had artificially created border incidents in order to give Hitler a pretext for a war with Poland. Two border incidents are cited, the attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz and a feigned attack by a Polish group at Hohenlinden.

The attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz was not carried out with the participation of Gestapo officials. The witness Naujocks,

who was the leader of this undertaking but did not belong to the Gestapo, has confirmed unequivocally that no member of the Gestapo participated in this action. Instructions for this

undertaking emanated directly from Heydrich and were transmitted orally by him directly to Naujocks.

Instructions concerning the feigned attack at Hohenlinden were transmitted by Mueller, the chief of Amt IV of the RSHA, to Naujocks; however, Naujocks, who directed this action, has expressly denied any participation by Amt IV.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Merkel, would that be a convenient time to break off?

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

DR. MERKEL: Mr. President, I have heard that the French translation of my final plea is not yet available to the interpreters. For that reason I shall have to speak more slowly for the benefit of the interpreters.

I have already deleted another 16 pages from my plea in order to comply with the ruling that I adhere to a time limit.

THE PRESIDENT: No doubt your speech will subsequently be translated and we shall have those pages before us.

DR. MERKEL: I had gone as far as the testimony of the witness Naujocks regarding the attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz and the attack of that group near Hohenlinden. He stated that, quite naturally, it was not one of the tasks of Amt IV of the RSHA to engineer border incidents. Nor did Mueller select members of Amt IV for the purpose of staging the above-mentioned border incident, but only individuals who were in his confidence; for Heydrich did not trust the Gestapo with respect to secrecy and reliability.

Naujocks stated literally: "I cannot identify Mueller with the organization of the Gestapo."

These border incidents were therefore no concern of the Gestapo, but rather a personal concern of Heydrich, even to the extent to which Mueller participated in them.

The Gestapo has not been accused of other crimes against peace. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-23-46.asp>)

DR. LATERNSE: What impression did the discussion on 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg make on you, Field Marshal?

VON RUNDSTEDT: When we left the conference, we thought that this undertaking would end just like the so-called Sudeten war in 1938, primarily because Russia was on our side. When on 26 August the movement for the beginning of operations, which had been ordered, was suddenly

stopped, and was to begin again on 1 September, we said, "Ah, that is the same kind of bluff which we had in 1938." We did not take the decision for war seriously.

DR. LATERNSE: Did you, after the conference of 22 August, talk to other commanders-in-chief and exchange ideas on the impressions gathered at this discussion?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I remember with certainty that I talked to Field Marshal Von Bock about it. I left Obersalzberg very quickly. With Manstein and later with my staff I exchanged the same views which I have just mentioned.

DR. LATERNSE: Did you have knowledge of the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station?

VON RUNDSTEDT: No.

DR. LATERNSE: In what way did you learn of the intention of occupying Denmark and Norway?

VON RUNDSTEDT: I learned of the accomplished fact through official channels.

DR. LATERNSE: How about the entry into Yugoslavia and Greece?

VON RUNDSTEDT: It was the same.

DR. LATERNSE: You participated in the conference in March 1941, when Hitler spoke of the necessity of attacking the Soviet Union?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes.

DR. LATERNSE: What were you told about Soviet preparations?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Until a short time before that I had been in France, and I had no knowledge whatever of the ostensible preparations of the Russians. At the conference, to our surprise, we were told that the Russians were very strongly armed, were concentrating troops and preparing to attack us. If I am not mistaken, information from the Japanese Military Attache was referred to, and a map of the Russian distribution of forces on the borders of Poland was shown to us, so that we had to assume that these facts were actually true.

DR. LATERNSE: Was this impression confirmed after the entry into Russia?

VON RUNDSTEDT: Yes. The resistance at the border was not too great, but it grew continually as we advanced into the interior of the country. Very strong tank forces, tanks of a better type, far superior to ours, appeared; and an enormous number of airfields, troop camps, munitions dumps, and newly built roads through impassable territory were encountered. Maps were also found, showing German territory as far as Silesia, so that we had the impression that Hitler must have been right. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-12-46.asp>)

Let us take the department of Foreign Affairs. Of all the administrative sections of the State, this, according to the orthodox conception, should be the farthest removed from political doctrine. Not so in Nazi Germany. With a view to the extermination of the Jews, headquarters abroad cooperated with the Reich Security Main Office through Wilhelmstrasse, as is shown by Documents RF-1206, 1220, 1502, 1210, and Exhibit Number USA-433 Document Number 3219-PS). Wilhelmstrasse officials were called upon to advise the military police and Secret State Police Document Number RF-1061). It was Best, Ribbentrop's representative in Denmark, who transmitted the order for the deportation of the Jews to the Chief of the German Police Mildner Document Number RF-1503). Document Number RF-1501 shows Ribbentrop defending anti-Semitism to Mussolini and asking for Italian cooperation.

Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner are implicated in all the terrorist measures taken against the elite. The SD and Wilhelmstrasse are also involved in the organization of attacks of a provocative nature, such as that made on the broadcasting station at Gleiwitz in order to furnish the pretext of an attack by the Poles. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-29-46.asp>)

DR. FRITZ: In this Trial it has been pointed out that there are no regulations in international law on the methods of propaganda in war and peace.

FRITZSCHE: I know very well that international law places no restrictions on propaganda, especially propaganda during war. I also know very well that only in a very few individual treaties between states are there regulations about the use of propaganda; for example in the German-Polish treaty and in the German-Soviet Union treaty. But in all my life as a journalist I have emphasized that the lack of international regulations as to propaganda is no excuse for lies. I always emphasized the moral responsibility of the journalist and newsman. I did so long before the war in an international discussion with Radio Luxembourg but it would lead too far afield to go into that here.

If last May I did not seek death, one of the reasons for this was my wish-I wanted to render an account of where, in that system, there were the pure idealism and the heroic sacrifices of millions, and where there were lies and the brutality which did not shrink from committing crimes.

DR. FRITZ: Please give us examples of cases wherein you felt you were deceived.

FRITZSCHE: During this Trial the news was discussed which circulated at the beginning of the Polish war about the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station. At that time I firmly believed in the truth of the official German news. I need say nothing about this case. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/06-27-46.asp>)

DR. STAHLER: Did you then on 1 September meet Goering again?

DAHLERUS: On 1 September I met Goering at 8 o'clock at his headquarters. After some hesitation he told me that the war had broken out because the Poles had attacked the radio station of Gleiwitz and blown up a bridge near Dirschau. Later he gave me more details from which I concluded that the full force of the German Army was employed in the attack on Poland.

DR. STAHLER: Did you then on 3 September meet Goering again, and did you on this occasion, make the suggestion that Goering should fly to London immediately for a personal conference? (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/03-19-46.asp>)

20 Dec. 45

In the final act in setting off the war-the attack on Poland in September 1939-the SS acted as a sort of stage manager. The Tribunal will recall the oral testimony of Erwin Lahousen with relation to the simulated attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz, by Germans dressed in Polish uniform-what Lahousen referred to as one of the most mysterious actions which took place in the Abwehr. Describing his task of getting the Polish uniforms and equipment together, he said at Page 620 of the transcript (Volume II, Page 450):

"These articles of equipment had to be prepared, and one day some man from the SS or the SD-the name is on the official diary of the War Department-fetched them."

I now offer in evidence Document 2751-PS, which is Exhibit USA-482. It is an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks, dated November 20, 1945. This affidavit particularly refers to the actual occurrences in connection with the Polish border incident. I believe it was referred to by the Witness Lahousen when he was on the stand:

"I, Alfred Helmut Naujocks, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

"1. I was a member of the SS from 1931 to 19 October 1944 and a member of the SD from its creation in 1934 to January 1941. I served as a member of the Waffen-SS from February 1941 until the middle of 1942. Later I served in the Economics Department of the Military Administration of Belgium from September 1942 to September 1944. I surrendered to the Allies on 19 October 1944.

"2. On or about 10 August 1939 the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Heydrich, personally ordered me to simulate an attack on the radio station near Gleiwitz, near the Polish border, and to make it appear that the attacking force consisted of Poles. Heydrich said: 'Actual proof of these attacks of the Poles is needed for the foreign press, as well as for German propaganda purposes.' I was directed to go to Gleiwitz with five or six SD men and wait there until I received a code word from Heydrich indicating that the attack should take place. My instructions were to seize the radio station and to hold it long enough to permit a Polish-speaking German, who would be put at my disposal, to broadcast a speech in Polish. Heydrich told me that this speech should state

that the time had come for the conflict between the Germans and the Poles and that the Poles should get together and strike down any Germans from whom they met resistance. Heydrich also told me at this time that he expected an attack on Poland by Germany in a few days.

“3. I went to Gleiwitz and waited there a fortnight. Then I requested permission of Heydrich to return to Berlin but was told to stay in Gleiwitz. Between the 25th and 31st of August I went to see Heinrich Muller, head of the Gestapo, who was then nearby at Oppeln. In my presence Muller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Muller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground at the scene of the incident to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the assault members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.

“4. Muller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was ‘Canned Goods.’

“5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I recall war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon on the 31st of August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o'clock that evening. Heydrich said, 'In order to carry out this attack, report to Muller for "Canned Goods."' I did this and gave Muller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive, but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds, but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.

“6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of 3 to 4 minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots, and left.”

And then “sworn to and subscribed to before Lieutenant Martin”. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/12-20-45.asp>)

4 April 46

DR. NELTE: You know, of course, that this matter was connected with the subsequent attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Do you know anything of this incident?

KEITEL: This incident, this action came to my knowledge for the first time here through the testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was charged to carry out such things and I knew

nothing of the raid on the radio station at Gleiwitz until I heard the testimonies given here before the Tribunal. Neither do I recall having heard at that time that such an incident had occurred.

DR. NELTE: Did you know of the efforts of America and Italy after 1 September 1939 to end the war in one way or another?

KEITEL: I knew nothing at all of the political discussions that took place in those days from the 24th to the 30th, 31st of August or the beginning of September 1939. I never knew anything about the visits of a Herr Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London's intervention. I remember only that, while in the Reich Chancellery for a short time, I met Hitler, who said to me: "Do not disturb me now, I am writing a letter to Daladier." This must have been in the first days of September. Neither I nor, to my knowledge, any of the other generals ever knew anything about the matters I have heard of here or about the steps that were still taken after 1 September. Nothing at all. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/04-04-46.asp>)

30 Nov. 45

COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal the nature of the assistance required?

LAHOUSEN The affair on which I am now giving testimony is one of the most mysterious actions which took place within the Amt Ausland-Abwehr. A few days, or sometime before – I believe it was the middle of August – the precise date can be found in the diary of the division-Abwehr Division I, as well as my division, Abwehr Division II, were given the task of providing Polish uniforms and equipment such as identification cards and so on, for an *Undertaking Himmler*. This request, according to an entry in the diary of the division which was kept not by me, but by my adjutant, was received by Canaris from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff or from the National Defense Department. I believe the name of General Warlimont is mentioned.

COL. AMEN: Do you know where this request originated?

LAHOUSEN: Where the request originated I cannot say, I can only say that it reached us in the form of an order. It was, to be sure, an order on which we, the divisional chiefs concerned, already had some misgivings without knowing what, in the last analysis, it meant. The name Himmler, however, spoke for itself, and that is also evident from entries of the diary which record my question why Herr Himmler should come to receive uniforms from us.

COL. AMEN: To whom was the Polish material to be furnished by the Abwehr?

LAHOUSEN: These articles of equipment had to be kept in readiness, and one day some man from the SS or the SD-the name is given in the official war diary of the division-collected them.

COL. AMEN: At what time was the Abwehr informed as to how this Polish material was to be used?

LAHOUSEN: The real purpose was unknown to us then; we do not know its details even today. All of us, however, had the reasonable suspicion that something entirely crooked was being planned; the name of the undertaking was sufficient guarantee for that.

COL. AMEN: Did you subsequently find out from Canaris what in fact had happened?

LAHOUSEN: The actual course of events was the following: When the first Wehrmacht communique spoke of the attack of Polish units on German territory, Pieckenbrock, holding the communique in his hand, and reading it aloud, observed that now we knew why our uniforms had been needed. On the same day or a few days later, I cannot say exactly, Canaris informed us that people from concentration camps had been disguised in these uniforms and had been ordered to make a military attack on the radio station at Gleiwitz. I cannot recall whether any other locality was mentioned. Although we were extremely interested, particularly General Oster, to know details of this action, that is, where it had occurred and what had happened-actually we could well imagine it, but we did not know how it was carried out-I cannot even today say exactly what happened.

COL. AMEN: Did you ever find out what happened to the men from the concentration camps who wore the Polish uniforms and created the incident?

LAHOUSEN: It is strange. This matter has always held my interest, and even after the capitulation I spoke about these matters with an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer-he was a Viennese in the hospital in which both of us were staying, and I asked him for details on what had taken place. The man – his name was Birckel – told me: “It is odd, that even our circles heard of this matter only very much later, and then only by intimation.” He added: “So far as I know, even all members of the SD who took part in that action were put out of the way, that is, killed.” That was the last I heard of this matter. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-30-45.asp>)

8 March 46

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, have you seen the Reich Marshal and Hitler when the reports came in of the bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam and of Coventry?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember whether I was present when the reports came.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never saw any such reactions on their part on those bombings, I take it?

BODENSCHATZ: I only know that Warsaw was a fortress which was held by the Polish Army in very great strength, provided with excellent pieces of artillery, that the forts were manned, and that two or three times Adolf Hitler announced that civilians should be evacuated from the city. That was rejected. Only the foreign embassies were evacuated, while an officer with a flag of truce entered. The Polish Army was in the city defending it stubbornly in a very dense circle of forts. The outer forts were very strongly manned, and from the inner town heavy artillery was

firing towards the outskirts. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore attacked, and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after Hitler's ultimatum had been rejected.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Coventry a fortified city?

BODENSCHATZ: Coventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city which housed the key industry of the enemy air force, in which the aircraft engines were built, a city in which, as far as I know, many factories were situated and many parts of these aircraft engines were manufactured. In any case, the Luftwaffe had at that time received orders to bomb only the industrial targets. If the city also suffered, it is understandable, considering the means of navigation at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated in November of 1945, were you not, by Colonel Williams?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was interrogated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Colonel Williams asked you about certain fictitious incidents along the German-Polish border late in August of 1939, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, he asked me about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel Williams whether I knew in advance about the incident of the Gleiwitz broadcasting section. I told him I knew nothing about it. It was only that the incidents on the Polish border were very similar to those which happened on the Czech border. It may have been presumed – that was only my opinion – that they were perhaps deliberate. But I had no positive proof that anything had been staged on our part.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as follows:

“I heard about it, but I personally at that time had the feeling that all these provocations that had taken place had originated from our side, from the German side. As I said, I had no real proofs of that, but I always had that feeling.”

Did you not say that?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you had talked with people about this, from whom you got that feeling. Is that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that very well now. I only know that the reports in the press gave me that suspicion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were asked, were you not, this question and gave this answer:

“Question: But you are of the opinion that what appeared in the press and these incidents that were reported were not true, but done merely to cause an incident as an excuse for an invasion?”

And did you not make this answer:

“I had that feeling. I cannot prove it, but I definitely know I had a feeling that the whole thing was being engineered by us.”

Did you not make that answer to that question?

BODENSCHATZ: The minutes will show it. If it is in the minutes, I said it. At the moment I cannot remember the exact words.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not deny the fact, however?

BODENSCHATZ: I had that feeling, but it was a purely subjective opinion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was your opinion?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now then, I ask you whether you were not interrogated about the Fuehrer's desire to make war on Poland, and whether you did not give this answer:

“Gentlemen, this question is very hard to answer, but I can state under my oath that the Fuehrer actually wanted the war against Poland. I can prove that he actually wanted a war of aggression against Poland by the circle surrounding the Fuehrer and the remarks that were made. I was present during the night when Hitler gave Henderson his conditions that he wanted Danzig, and I concluded from all the conferences that the Fuehrer had with the Ambassador – I had the impression that the Fuehrer did not really want the Poles to accept those conditions.”

And I ask you if you made those answers to Colonel Williams?

BODENSCHATZ: I can make the following answer to that:

I was not present at the conference. If I said that, I did not express myself correctly. I was not at the conference that the Fuehrer had with Henderson, but I was standing in the anterooms with the other adjutants, and outside in the anteroom one could hear the various groups, some saying one thing, some another. From these conversations I gather that the conditions which Henderson received for the Poles in the evening were such, and that the time limit for answering these

questions – which was noon of the next day – was so short, that one could conclude there was a certain intention behind it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is the impression that you received from being in the anteroom and talking with the people who were about Hitler that night?

BODENSCHATZ: There were adjutants, the Reich Press Chief, and the gentlemen who were waiting in the anteroom without taking part in the conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask you, in order to make this very clear, one more question about your interrogation on that subject. Were you not asked this question:

“Then we can summarize your testimony this morning by saying that you knew in 1938, several months before Germany attacked Poland, that Hitler fully intended to attack Poland and wage an aggressive war against her; is that right?”

And did you not make this answer:

“I can only say this with certainty that from the night when he told Henderson that he wanted Danzig and the Corridor, from that moment, I was sure Hitler intended to wage an aggressive war.”

Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer?

BODENSCHATZ: If it is in the minutes, I said it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if it were not in the minutes, it would still be your testimony now, would it not? It is a fact, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: My definition is precisely this: From the handing over of Adolf Hitler's demands to Henderson and from the short time that Henderson was granted, I conclude that there was a certain intention. That is how I should like to define it precisely now.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number L-79, United States exhibit in evidence, Number USA-27. You have seen that before, witness?

BODENSCHATZ: A copy of this document was shown to me by Colonel Williams, and I told him that I myself could not remember having been present. But if my name is on the minutes, then I was there.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your name is on the document, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Then I was there. I cannot remember the subject of this conference. I told Colonel Williams that that must have been discussed because Colonel Schmudt, whose handwriting I know – I was shown a copy – I told him that Colonel Schmudt was a man who was very conscientious in making his notes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all in his handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: That is it as I see it here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is signed by Colonel Schmudt?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is signed by Colonel Schmudt – Lieutenant Colonel Schmudt. The corrections are not in his handwriting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the body of the document is his handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is his own handwriting. I know it; yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you were asked about that by Colonel Williams, you took time to read it, and then you said, did you not: “I think that the thoughts are right as they are expressed here; these are the thoughts that the Fuehrer usually voiced to us in a small circle.” You made that statement?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I did say that, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you said: “I cannot remember whether these things were expressed on that day. However, it is possible that the thoughts which are put down here are the thoughts of Adolf Hitler.” You said that to Colonel Williams, did you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that to Colonel Williams.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all I care to ask about that, Sir. (Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/03-08-46.asp>)